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Constructing the Double Circulation of Capital and 
“Social Impact.” An Ethnographic Study of a  
French Impact Investment Fund 
Théo Bourgeron ∗ 
Abstract: »Die Konstruktion der doppelten Zirkulation von Kapital und 
,sozialem Impact‘. Eine ethnographische Studie über einen französischen Im-
pact-Investitionsfond«. Elaborating on a three-month ethnography of an im-
pact investing fund called Impact Equity, this article aims to understand the 
mechanisms at work in the emergence of the impact investing sector. After 
presenting the case of Impact Equity (section 1), the article details the norms 
and devices through which impact investing is constructed in everyday finan-
cial work (sections 2 and 3) and investigates how impact investors mobilise 
moral beliefs and strategic motivations to navigate competing definitions of 
“social impact” (section 4). In doing so, this article outlines how the construc-
tion of the sector has involved the creation of channels enabling capital and 
“social impact” to circulate between institutional investors, impact investment 
funds, and “impactful businesses,” and it highlights the historical tensions that 
this process has involved. 
Keywords: Impact investing, ethnography, social impact, social value, social 
studies of finance, impact equity, France. 
1. Introduction 
Towards the end of autumn 2015, in a meeting room in a French Cistercian 
abbey converted into a seminar venue for companies, a “coach” specialising in 
the “management libéré” movement1 asks Impact Equity members to sum up 
 
∗  Théo Bourgeron, ERC Misfires, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland; 
theo.bourgeron@ucd.ie. 
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1  The management libéré (liberated management) movement, inspired by French business 
school scholar Isaac Getz’s book (2017) on the entreprise libérée (liberated company), pro-
motes allegedly horizontal, non-hierarchised modes of management, which are supposedly 
more meaningful for employees and profitable for shareholders. 
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their “project” for the fund in “striking” sentences, write this on coloured post-
its, and “share” with each other. To describe her vision of Impact Equity’s 
future, Emilie, one of the partners of the fund, writes on her post-it: “activer 
l’impact.” With this pun (actif in French means both active and asset and so 
activer l’impact suggests both activating and assetising impact) she intends to 
underline two projects in which Impact Equity is involved. First (activation), 
the activist project of transforming the companies it owns in a social direction 
in order to generate “social impact.” Second (assetisation), the project of estab-
lishing a conversion interface between “social impact” and financial capital in 
order to turn impactful businesses into profitable assets. In doing so, she invol-
untarily reflects a tension in the sector between alternative visions of “social 
impact” (a philanthropic one, focused on the generation of social value through 
activism, and a financial one, drawing an equivalence between impact and 
financial capital, focusing on the assetisation of impact through market mecha-
nisms). This article highlights how impact investors deal with such competing 
directions while constructing the circuits of impact and capital in their every-
day financial work. 
1.1  Studying the Circuits of Capital and “Social Impact” 
The impact investing sector emerged in the late 2000s in the US and Europe, 
aiming to generate “social impact” through financial investments (Oleksiak et 
al. 2015; Barman 2016). There are various kinds of impact investing practices, 
from investments in which financial actors try to produce a positive “social 
impact” while engaging in profitable investments, to practices in which “social 
value” is defined as a financial asset that investors (for instance, public institu-
tions) should buy in exchange for capital.  
The emergence of the sector relied on the construction of new capitalistic 
circuits at the margins of traditional finance. As in other cases of financialisa-
tion, in which new financial circuits are created,2 this process requires the 
building of the channels through which capital can circulate between capital 
holders and economic actors – channels involving flows of financial capital in 
exchange for the generation of “social impact.” Taken together, these channels 
constitute the emerging circuit of the impact investment sector.  
In the case of the impact investing sector, the circulation of financial capital 
requires the simultaneous circulation of “social impact.” When they invest 
money into “impactful companies,” impact investing funds seek to make these 
companies “generate social impact.” Indeed, in order to be entrusted with capi-
tal from institutional investors, impact investment funds have to circulate the 
“social impact” generated by their “impactful businesses” among institutional 
 
2  See, for instance, Ducastel and Anseeuw (2017) on agro-financial circuits and Benquet and 
Bourgeron (forthcoming) on the circuits of private equity finance. 
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investors. This circulation is different from the circulation of cash flows: “so-
cial impact” is not an appropriable asset that can be transferred between two 
financial actors. Rather, it relies on accounting devices aiming to materialise 
social impact in such a way that each flow of capital (and each investment by 
an institutional investor) can be associated with the generation of a form of 
social impact. 
The channels of the double circulation of capital and impact are constituted 
by a heterogeneous set of socio-technical devices – including public regula-
tions, metrological instruments, management devices, and moral norms. Build-
ing on the influence of science and techniques studies (STS), recent works have 
shown how the construction of financial markets relies not only on political 
orientation, but also on socio-technical norms and devices (Beunza and Stark 
2004; MacKenzie and Hardie 2007; MacKenzie 2008). This approach has 
redefined capitalist institutions by turning them into a broader “institutional 
assemblage” or “arrangement” that includes not only legal regulations, but also 
social norms and technical devices (Callon 1998; Callon and Muniesa 2005). It 
has also been used to understand new forms of social finance through the study 
of financial and management devices (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017; Barman 
2020, this special issue). Impact investors are engaged in the construction of 
the impact investing sector as they build the norms and devices that constitute 
its financial channels.  
Despite focusing on impact investors, this article does not ignore the institu-
tional dimension of this process. The role of the state is particularly marked in 
the context of my ethnographic observation, as public authorities became heav-
ily involved in the structuring of the sector through regulations,3 reports,4 and 
direct action.5 However, impact investors themselves take part in this institu-
tional construction by actively engaging in lobbying and coproducing the regu-
lations of the sector with ministries and public agencies. They also constantly 
interact with public financial institutions that provide them with capital and 
negotiate the way capital should be distributed and social impact accounted for.  
Recent literature has focused on the role of the state in the building of the 
sector (Wiggan 2018; Williams 2018; Golka 2019), but few works have ex-
plored the role of financiers themselves (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017; Hell-
man 2020, this special issue). This article therefore complements the existing 
literature by providing the reader with an account of how impact investors 
 
3  Such as the European Social Entrepreneurship Fund status (EU regulations 345-2013 and 
346-2013), which gives a legal framework to impact investing funds in the EU.  
4  Such as the French Comité Français (2014) and the European Commission (2018) reports. 
5  Through public financial institutions that heavily fund the sector, such as the French 
Banque Publique d’Investissement, the European Investment Fund, and the British Big Socie-
ty Capital funds. 
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become involved in the production of the socio-technical circuits that are key to 
the emergence of impact investing. 
1.2  Competing Definitions of “Social Impact” 
The emergence of the impact investing sector has engaged with a number of 
historical and political tensions. The construction of these circuits of capital is 
both a moral and a political activity (Ortiz 2013; Arjaliès et al. 2017). Indeed, 
in the same way that money is earmarked and framed by social meanings and 
norms (Zelizer 1994; Dodd 2014), these channels are embedded into social 
norms. The impact investing sector has relied on competing definitions of 
“social impact.” Previous works have already noted the fragmented dimension 
of the impact investing field in relation to different definitions of impact and 
the attempts to unify these (Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). This fragmentation 
is organised around two main oppositions: on the one hand, an opposition 
between “quantitative” and “qualitative” ways of measuring impact and, on the 
other, opposition on the commensurability of social impact and financial return 
between “commensurable” and “non-commensurable” forms of impact (Bar-
man 2016; Chiapello and Godefroy 2017). Reports on the emergence of the 
sector by the Rockefeller Foundation and JP Morgan (JP Morgan 2010) have 
included both qualitative (through the use of labels to define impact, such as 
Responsible Investment [RI] and Environment, Social, Governance [ESG], as 
shown by Barman 2016) and quantitative (through performance indicators) 
methods of impact evaluation, although impact was remaining incommensura-
ble to financial return (it was not considered to be exchangeable at a deter-
mined rate against financial capital). More recently, actors such as the Europe-
an Investment Fund (EIF) have promoted a definition of impact based on both 
quantitative evaluation and commensurability, aiming to “price social value” 
(Grabenwarter 2012) in order to know the financial price of a given quantity of 
“social impact.” 
The definition of social impact interacts with the strategic and moral uni-
verse of impact investors. As they engage in the building of channels of capital 
and impact through the use of specific socio-technical devices, they position 
themselves with respect to the two broad oppositions at work in this definition. 
This article highlights how impact investors’ moral and strategic motivations 
affect the way they interpret these alternative definitions of social impact and 
support some of them. 
1.3  Argument of the Article 
This article details the construction of the double circulation of capital and 
“social impact” in the impact investing sector. An overview of this is presented 
in Graph 1. The graph represents the channels through which capital is accu-
mulated from institutional investors to investment funds, and from investment 
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funds to “impactful businesses,” before being channelled back to institutional 
investors. It also outlines how at each of these steps, “social impact” is circu-
lated by each of these actors through accounting and reporting practices. Each 
of the arrows on the graph represents socio-technical devices that enable the 
distribution of cash flows and the accounting of “social impact” in the real 
world. 
This article makes two main contributions. Firstly, after providing the reader 
with a quick overview of Impact Equity’s case (section 2), it carefully follows 
the circuits of capital and social impact from the bottom to the top of Graph 1 
and describes the building of channels that enable capital to circulate between, 
on the one hand, funds and “impactful businesses” (section 3), and, on the other 
hand, funds and capital holders (section 4). Secondly, it highlights the historical 
tensions over the definition of “social impact” that come into play in this pro-
cess, as Impact Equity was pushed from its initial definition of impact (in 
which it was qualitative and incommensurable) to more recent definitions of 
impact promoted by institutional investors (who ask it to measure impact quan-
titatively and to make it commensurable to financial return). It emphasises how 
the devices that constitute the circuits of impact investing result from the heter-
ogeneous set of moral beliefs and strategic motivations mobilised by impact 
investors in their exchanges with “impactful businesses” and institutional in-
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2. Presentation of the Empirical Material 
2.1  Methodology and Data 
This article is based on participant observation of a French asset management 
company specialising in impact investing (which I call Impact Equity – the 
name of the company and asset managers I observed have been changed, along 
with non-substantial details, to ensure anonymity). This participant observation 
took place during a three-month internship in the Impact Equity offices, during 
which time I was required to help the company in the ongoing reform of its 
“investment strategy” (i.e., the social and financial criteria that determine the 
capacity of the fund to invest in a company).  
During this internship, I was able to record seven formal interviews with 
members of the fund,6 discussing their previous careers, their personal under-
standing of their activities, and their past operations. I also attended numerous 
informal discussions between fund members, and between fund members and 
external actors, and I was able to attend several meetings with entrepreneurs, 
(future) competitors, and financial investors. I further participated in a two-day 
corporate seminar that set the new “investment strategy” of the asset manage-
ment company. Finally, I was able to access most of the fund’s internal docu-
ments, including the contract binding the asset management company to its 
financial investors and details of negotiations with investors and entrepreneurs. 
2.2  The Case of Impact Equity 
Impact Equity belongs to the broader “private equity” financial industry (and 
more specifically its “venture capital” subset, as it invests in small companies).7 
The asset management company raises money from institutional investors 
(such as banks, insurance companies, funds of funds, public financial institu-
tions, pension funds, and family offices) and then invests this in private, non-
listed companies that generate a financial profit and what the impact investors 
consider to be “social impact.” It invests based on a set of financial and social 
criteria that are defined in the fund’s “investment strategy” and translated into 
specific indicators during the investment process. After approximately five 
years, the company liquidates its investment and distributes the money from the 
 
6  I undertook interviews with each of the six fund members except Alice, the intern (who had 
started her job too recently). I interviewed Partner 1 (Emilie) and Partner 2 (Jean) twice 
each. 
7  In her thesis, Château-Terrisse (2013) also observed similar venture capital funds, focusing 
on the role of management devices. 
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sale back to the institutional investors, generally with a financial gain. Over the 
course of the entire investment period, the fund also reports to investors on the 
social impact that its “impactful businesses” have generated.  
Impact Equity was managing approximately 100 million euros at the time of 
my observation, with a team of six8 (see Table 1 below for a description of 
their social characteristics). Impact Equity was created in 2007 by the president 
of the fund, Henri, and Partner 1, Emilie, as an experimental asset management 
company. It raised its first two funds in the late 2000s and early 2010s (Impact 
Equity I and Impact Equity II, which amount to a combined €50m) from a set 
of private (mostly cooperative banks and insurance companies) and public (the 
French Banque Publique d’Investissement, BPI) investors. With these first two 
funds, Impact Equity was considered a small standard private equity fund with 
innovative social positioning. At the time of my observation, the company was 
raising its third fund (Impact Equity III, which amounted to €50m). As part of 
this, Impact Equity was hoping to get most of its capital from the large institu-
tional investors specialising in impact investing that were emerging in the mid-
2010s. It targeted the “impact” funds of funds recently set up by large banks, 
insurance companies, and public institutions (such as Axa’s Impact Fund or the 
European Investment Fund’s [EIF] Social Impact Accelerator).  
Despite its seemingly modest size, Impact Equity was one of the first and 
largest French impact investing funds in its category. In 2018, the French pri-
vate equity impact investing sector included 26 asset management companies 
(with around 700 companies), managing €1.6bn collectively (France Invest 
2019). Among these, Impact Equity had achieved the most prestigious labels in 
the French impact investing sector. It was a leading member of France Invest’s 
“impact investing” working group9 and it counted the two most prestigious 
public financial institutions for French impact investing funds among its insti-
tutional investors: the EIF and the BPI (receiving investments from the BPI is a 
sign of prestige in the sector of French investment funds; Bourgeron 2019). 
To locate Impact Equity in the broader impact investing environment, the 
fund should be distinguished from other types of actors. Within the chain of 
impact investment capital, Impact Equity is located below institutional inves-
tors specialising in impact, such as impact investment funds of funds (e.g., the 
EIF Social Impact Accelerator, Axa Impact Fund, Big Society Capital, Rocke-
feller Foundation) that collect money directly from savers or governments 
through impactful or responsible investment schemes. As seen in Graph 1, 
Impact Equity receives its capital from these institutional investors. It is located 
 
8  These are referred to as “fund managers” or “fund members” in the article. Although the 
companies that Impact Equity has in its portfolio do have their own employees, Impact Eq-
uity relies exclusively on its six fund members. 
9  France Invest is a powerful lobby for French private equity funds, studied in Benquet and 
Bourgeron (forthcoming). 
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above impactful businesses (Impact Equity invests in these businesses) and 
other social impact intermediaries, such as social impact auditors (e.g., 
KPMG’s specialised branch), to which Impact Equity sometimes orders impact 
reports. Finally, it is distinct from impact investors focused on other kinds of 
assets, such as those specialising in funding listed companies, bonds, or crowd-
funding opportunities (e.g., social impact exchange traded funds [ETF], social 
impact bonds [SIB] and crowdfunding websites). 
According to its “investment strategy,” defined by the mandate it signed 
with its institutional investors, Impact Equity invests in companies based on 
financial and social criteria: 
1) financial criteria: it invests in “small profitable companies,” i.e., compa-
nies with annual sales lower than €30m and a positive or negative but 
growing profit; 
2) social criteria: it invests in companies that match at least one of the fol-
lowing three criteria: 
- “impact through activity” for companies that engage in a social activity 
(this includes companies providing services to poor neighbourhoods or 
elderly people);  
- “impact through management” for companies that are managed based 
on social principles (this includes companies redistributing a portion of 
their profits to employees or hiring people who have been unemployed 
long-term);  
- the “impact through exemplarity” criterion for companies whose CEO 
is iconic (this includes companies managed by inspirational leaders, 
such as people from ethnic minorities, with a disability or with an im-
pressive personal trajectory). 
The “impact through exemplarity” criterion was considered by Impact Equity’s 
members to be the most distinctive social criterion for the fund – as it was 
characteristic of the fund’s “brand” for institutional investors. As an example of 
these investments, Impact Equity has invested in a small chain of Mexican 
restaurants managed by two self-made businessmen who are immigrants from 
North Africa, and a phone company that provides elderly people with connect-
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3.  Investing in “Impactful” Businesses, Constructing 
Financialised Social Entrepreneurship  
Social activities are not spontaneously “investable” activities; impact investors 
are involved in their transformation into financialisable companies. Focusing 
on the bottom part of Graph 1, this section illustrates how impact investors 
struggle to invest their capital in “impactful businesses” by showing how they 
search for investable companies and label them “impactful.” 
3.1  Categorising and Identifying “Impactful” Targets 
Impact investors are involved in the building of the “social impact” category 
itself. They build the criteria defining “impactful businesses” and apply them to 
economic activities, framing the targeted companies in a set of judgement 
devices (Karpik 2010) related to impact. 
When a company is labelled as an “impactful business,” this refers back to 
criteria defined in Impact Equity’s “investment strategy.” This is performed 
through a series of procedures, which begin with the reception of “investment 
opportunities.” Companies seeking funding (or their merger and acquisition 
[M&A] advisors) constantly send “opportunities” to the fund (constituting what 
Impact Equity members call the “deal flow”) in the form of PDF documents of 
around ten pages that outline the main characteristics of the company and its 
funding needs. When the documents are received in the fund’s mailbox, Alice 
(the intern at Impact Equity) registers the “opportunity” in an internal database, 
filling in numerous boxes related to it: the name and a description of the com-
pany as well as boxes called “financial criteria” and “non-financial criteria” 
(meaning the “impact” criteria), and then her “opinion” after this initial selec-
tion phase. Alice therefore delineates companies that will not be investigated 
further by Impact Equity members and companies that will be considered po-
tentially viable “impactful businesses” (investible for an impact investing 
fund). With regard to the “non-financial” box, Alice can categorise each com-
pany into one of a number of groups: “none” when she finds no impact at all 
(she then recommends not examining the investment case); “potential impact” 
when she is unsure about either the categorisation of the company; and the 
corresponding impact criterion when an impact criterion is clearly visible (for 
instance, “impact through exemplarity” when she thinks the company meets the 
corresponding criterion of the fund defined in its “investment strategy”).  
In this process, the categorising of companies into two groups (investable 
“impactful businesses” and other companies) is grounded on the criteria of 
Impact Equity’s “investment strategy.” For instance, Alice considered that the 
Tacos company (a chain of Mexican restaurants that Impact Equity has invest-
HSR 45 (2020) 3  │  128 
ed in) matched the financial criteria of the fund (as it was a small profitable 
company) and two of its three social criteria: “impact through management” (as 
it was recruiting its employees from disadvantaged neighbourhoods) and “im-
pact through exemplarity” (as its two co-CEOs were self-made businessmen 
from ethnic minorities). Later, Alice’s first judgement is discussed in the “deal 
flow meeting,” an important weekly meeting with all the members of the fund 
during which time decisions are taken regarding these investment opportunities 
– they engage in the negotiation and investment process as they consider 
whether a company matches their investment strategy. 
Therefore, the labelling of a company as an investable “impactful business” 
depends on these criteria that mix together heterogeneous categories, metrolo-
gies, and projects for impact investing (a “bazar of rationalities”: Godechot 
2000), through a bureaucratic labelling process.  
3.2  Constructing and Structuring the Market of “Impactful 
Businesses” 
To find such investable “impactful businesses,” impact investors organise the 
market for “impactful businesses” based on their financial needs. The impact 
investing sector depends on the existence of such businesses, their openness to 
financial investment, and their contact with impact investing funds (for in-
stance, through the emergence of intermediaries; Bessy and Chauvin 2013). 
The creation and shaping of the “impactful business” product is performed to a 
large extent by impact investors themselves.11 
In the course of my observation, members of Impact Equity were worrying 
about what they tended to consider their main problem: the lack of available 
“investment opportunities,” i.e., investable “impactful businesses.” To prepare 
for the discussions in the Impact Equity company seminar, I was allocated 
(along with a partner, an associate, and another intern) to an internal workshop 
entitled “Amplifying the Qualified Deal Flow.” Following the recommenda-
tions of this workshop, the fund developed an activist strategy focusing on 
corporate managers, described by Henri, the president, as the “roaming the 
backcountry” strategy. Applying his method, after contacting corporate manag-
ers through LinkedIn or contacts, Henri would often go to relatively remote 
places in the countryside to meet small-scale entrepreneurs that he had identi-
fied as interesting. These meetings were not designed to create an immediate 
investment opportunity, but it was hoped that “the day the manager thinks that 
he needs money to invest,” they would eventually get back in touch with Henri. 
Therefore, the asset management company disseminates its own trademark as 
 
11  See Cochoy and Vabre (2007) for a similar process in the corporate social responsibility 
market. 
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well as the logic of financial investment in places where it has not previously 
existed. 
Impact investors also structure the market for “impactful businesses” by set-
ting up networks of intermediaries. Impact Equity members decided to actively 
involve themselves in supporting and meeting transaction intermediaries. In 
particular, they got in touch with merger and acquisitions (M&A) advisors (in 
the case of Impact Equity, small “boutiques” or even individuals), some of 
whom specialised in small or “impactful” companies. They attempted to identi-
fy all the intermediaries who were active in their market by looking at those 
that intermediated in the transactions of their competitors and getting in touch 
with them. They also developed a protocol of “courtoisie” meetings with entre-
preneurs: when an entrepreneur was introduced to them by an intermediary 
they had identified as relevant (establishing an implicit hierarchy of intermedi-
aries), they would meet the entrepreneur, even when their corporate project did 
not match the fund’s criteria, in the hope that the M&A advisor would send 
them additional relevant investment opportunities later on. Impact Equity man-
agers also got involved in networks of entrepreneurs as active participants and 
funders. For instance, Impact Equity’s president became involved in the Vive 
l’entreprise! network, which was dedicated to companies involved in the 
“management of liberation” movement,12 by giving a talk at the network’s 
annual meeting. This involvement was understood as a way to meet the manag-
ers of companies that could potentially match the “social impact” criteria of the 
fund.  
Finally, the construction and structuring of the “impactful business” market 
is also the product of an institutional arrangement. Public actors and legal 
norms are involved in the building of impact investing, as shown in the litera-
ture (Wiggan 2018; Golka 2019). Impact investors take an active role in the 
construction of these institutions. Impact Equity participated in several working 
groups organised by French ministries and the European Commission, aiming 
to define and legally frame impact investing and impactful businesses.13 For 
instance, I saw Impact Equity partners attending a meeting in the office of the 
French Agence Pour la Création d’Entreprise (APCE), which was aiming to 
support small-scale entrepreneurs, and attending a working group at the minis-
try of Social Economy and Consumption. In these places, Impact Equity pro-
moted a social entrepreneurship that was open to capital investments and exter-
nal investors – in which impact investing funds played a central role.  
 
12  See footnote 1. 
13  For instance, it participated in developing the reports of Comité Français (2014) and the 
European Commission (2018) on impact investing.  
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3.3  Formatting Companies to “Generate Social Return” 
Impact investors are further involved in making their portfolio of impactful 
businesses “generate social impact.” The generation of impact is not limited to 
defining and applying “impact” categories to businesses; once a company has 
been categorised as “impactful,” its “social impact” still needs to be objectified, 
materialised, extracted, and eventually made transmittable to actors external to 
the impactful business that “produces” it.  
The generation of accountable “social impact” requires the transformation of 
the invested companies. This can be exemplified by the (failed) investment 
process of Business Academy, a company proposing to prepare undergraduate 
students for business schools’ competitive examinations.14 In the investment 
negotiation with Impact Equity, the company had no clearly defined “social 
impact.” As a consequence, the fund members sought to create this impact by 
putting the company’s future CEO in touch with a charity specialising in aca-
demic support, which they knew through personal networks. They thereby 
attempted to generate immediate “social impact” by hybridising the economic 
activity they wanted to buy with a charity. Similarly, Impact Equity worked 
with a consultant specialising in the “management libéré” movement. Impact 
Equity managers intended to turn Telephonia (a company they owned that 
specialised in producing phones for elderly people) into a “liberated company.” 
This “liberation” operated both as a reality (the consultant engaged in manage-
rial practices within Telephonia: he encouraged its CEO to create decision 
committees in which employees could discuss Telephonia’s production pro-
cesses in a non-hierarchical way15) and as a social impact label (considering 
Telephonia as a “liberated company,” fund managers could apply the “impact 
through management” criterion of Impact Equity’s “investment strategy” to the 
company).  
Finally, the generation of accountable “social impact” requires the format-
ting of impactful activities through indicators. Fund managers seek to “materi-
alise” the latent social impact of the companies in which they invest. In the 
case of Business Academy, this required the identification of indicators related 
to the social origins of the students. Francis, the associate of the fund, elaborat-
ed statistics about the number of students receiving grants (in France, grants are 
generally provided on social grounds, e.g., because of low parental income) 
within business schools and within the pool of students attempting to access 
 
14  The investment process finally failed, as the CEO that was expected to buyout Business 
Academy with the support of Impact Equity was put off by the consideration that framing 
Business Academy as an “impactful” company would be unappealing to students and thus 
negatively affect the activity of the firm. 
15  However, this committee had limited power in the case of Telephonia, as employees could 
not challenge the main financial decisions that had been negotiated between Impact Equity 
and Telephonia’s CEO.  
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business schools. Then, Francis outlined a target (expressed as a percentage) 
number of such students to have access to Business Academy – either through 
changing the recruitment process or enabling Business Academy to provide 
grants (by waiving the tuition fees) to some of its students. The achievement of 
this target number of students receiving grants would then become a “social 
impact indicator,” which would in turn determine the “impact” of the invest-
ment. 
4.  Attracting Capital from Institutional Investors, 
Constructing “Social Impact” and Money Circulation 
Devices 
The emergence of impact investing requires new circuits enabling institutional 
investors (that collect savings and government money) to allocate it to the 
sector. Focusing on the top part of Graph 1, this section highlights how impact 
investors construct the circuits through which capital and social impact circu-
late between themselves and institutional investors, requiring legitimation 
practices and the elaboration of technical devices.  
4.1  ”Evangelising” Institutional Investors to Raise Capital 
As Impact Equity members themselves acknowledged, impact investors are 
engaged in the financialisation process: as Jean told me, when setting up a new 
impact asset management company, they participate in “creating a new asset 
class.” To create their own “asset class,” impact investors have to develop their 
legitimacy to manage capital, both by recycling their legitimacy as traditional 
asset managers and by creating new needs for capital holders.  
Impact investment fund managers accumulate legitimacy by displaying 
prestigious investment “track-records” (an inventory of their past operations 
and performances). In the context of Impact Equity, the attention given to past 
performance is evoked by the meeting between, on the one side, Henri (presi-
dent of Impact Equity) and Emilie (partner at Impact Equity), and on the other, 
two women planning to launch a new impact investing fund and looking for 
advice. Henri and Emilie outlined how difficult it is to raise a fund for the first 
time: they explained that important public investors (such as the European 
Investment Fund) systematically refuse to participate in fundraising sessions 
for “asset management firms with no track-record.” In a similar way, the first 
fund managed by Impact Equity was about to close (to be redistributed to its 
investors) at approximately the same time that they were trying to raise their 
third fund (Impact Equity III). When talking about this with an investor in the 
first fund, the investor explained that their ability to raise the third fund would 
above all be determined by the financial performance of their first: “if the IRR 
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[internal rate of return, an indicator of financial performance] of [the first fund] 
is good, everything will be fine,” he told them. 
The construction of the impact investing sector also requires institutional in-
vestors to be morally converted to holding “social” assets. During their corpo-
rate seminar, Impact Equity managers explicitly referred to this conversion 
process and the way to foster it. Talking about the communication policy of 
Impact Equity, they agreed on the fact that, as a matter of principle, a standard 
investment fund should adopt the most minimalist communication policy pos-
sible. However, in the case of Impact Equity, they decided to deviate from that 
norm and adopt an active communication policy because “[they] still have to 
evangelise the market.” This “evangelisation” process entails socialising with 
investors and trying to convince them through personal interactions: Impact 
Equity members aimed to attract institutional investors by frequently meeting 
them and organising annual meetings (the annual “investors’ cocktail”) with 
them. Impact Equity also experimented with new and popular financial devices. 
Evoking the project of launching a social impact bond (SIB),16 in which the 
fund would participate either as a funder or as an intermediary, the members of 
Impact Equity remained sceptical about the financial return of such an opera-
tion. However, Emilie, a partner, asserted in a discussion that even if the SIB 
had a low chance of being financially profitable, they should envision it as “a 
kind of research and development expense.” Henri, the president of the fund, 
added: “or even as communication expenses.” Therefore, the activities of Im-
pact Equity were designed to popularise impact investment among institutional 
investors. 
4.2  Elaborating the Impact Fundraising “Business Model” 
Impact investing actors also elaborate the formal structures that are in charge of 
managing capital and making it circulate. Building on the traditional formal 
structures of private equity funds, Impact Equity’s managers tended to experi-
ment with the form of asset management companies that allow capital to circu-
late, while at the same time conditioning this circulation to the generation of 
“social impact.”  
Reflecting on themselves in terms of the “business model,” they attempted 
to find what they consider to be the optimal formal structure for operating 
impact investment transactions. During my observation, Impact Equity’s man-
agers studied a hypothetical alliance with a company called Philanthropia, 
which specialised in fundraising for charities. They studied the hypothesis of 
 
16  The SIB is a recent financial innovation, elaborated in the US and the UK, in which public 
authorities pay private funders a variable amount of money, depending on the achievement 
of pre-established social targets, enabling the private funder to make a profit if it success-
fully achieves these targets. Recent SIBs are detailed by Neyland (2017) and Tse and Warner 
(2018). 
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entering into a partnership with it in order to make their own fundraising activi-
ties easier (by attracting more philanthropic investors), thus envisioning a het-
erodox model compared to traditional asset management companies. Impact 
Equity members also planned to establish a partnership with other asset man-
agement companies that were similar to them (for instance, an investment fund 
specialising in education companies), in order to find “synergies” to mutualise 
a part of their costs (such as the rent for the office, administrative staff, ac-
counting costs, etc.) and find co-investment opportunities on some deals (which 
generally require less time and involvement from both investors). 
4.3 Negotiating the Legal and Metrological Mechanisms of “Social 
Impact” 
Finally, the circulation of capital within impact investing requires the construc-
tion of legal, metrological and financial devices through which financial capital 
can circulate simultaneously with “social impact.” In this respect, Impact Equi-
ty members are involved in negotiating the “carried-interest” device, which 
regulates the variable remuneration of Impact Equity’s partners by institutional 
investors. Historically, impact investing funds such as Impact Equity are remu-
nerated based on the “carried-interest” device used in standard private equity 
funds, the “2/8/20” carried-interest mechanism (Appelbaum and Batt 2014) 
through which the asset management company receives 2% of the overall 
amount of the fund (with some refinements) each year over the course of 10 
years, plus 20% of the gain at the end of the period if the overall IRR of the 
fund is higher than 8%.  
However, Impact Equity managers negotiated a new contractual device with 
the investors in the third fund, which formalised “impact” as commensurable to 
financial capital: “social carried-interest.” Indeed, a new investor in the third 
fund (the EIF) required the implementation of a conditionality clause in the 
“carried-interest” device, in which the payment of the 20% performance bonus 
depended on the achievement of the social targets of the fund. This new device 
was contested by Impact Equity members, who feared that the new condition 
would mean they lost their personal (financial) interest in the success of the 
companies the fund owned. Indeed, if the social targets of the fund were not 
achieved, they would be no more incentivised to care about the financial per-
formance of their invested companies, whilst the maximum amount of money 
they would receive if they achieved their social targets was not increased, re-
sulting in their hostility to this new mechanism. 
Through their “fundraising advisor” (a consultancy firm specialising in 
fundraising for asset management companies), Impact Equity’s managers nego-
tiated this “social carried-interest” device. In exchange for this new clause, they 
asked for a change in the numbers of the classical “2/8/20” carried-interest 
formula, which would take into account the particularly low financial profita-
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bility of impact investing (the formula would have become 2/6/20). They did 
not succeed in this request, but did gain agreement that the social condition 
would affect only half of the carried interest (the other half being independent 
from social targets).  
The new contract binding Impact Equity to investors also noted the exist-
ence of a new metrological structure (the “impact committee”) aiming to estab-
lish impact targets and calculate the “real” generated impact. This committee 
was designed as an independent third party (e.g., headed by an audit firm, 
although these details were not known at the time of observation) that calculat-
ed the achievement of the social objectives that condition the “social carried 
interest” payment. Therefore, this new device affected all aspects of Impact 
Equity’s potential life after its third fundraising session: the fund planned to 
hire external consultants who would operate this committee as an “independent 
third party” and calculate the “social impact” generated by each company based 
on the standards of the emerging impact investing market. 
5.  Tension between Alternative Definitions of Social 
Impact and Devices for the Impact Investing Sector 
Having shown how impact investors construct the circuits of social finance, 
establishing ties between their asset management companies, “impactful busi-
nesses” (section 3), and capital holders (section 4), section 5 emphasises the 
historical conflicts involved in this construction. Highlighting the role of im-
pact investors’ moral beliefs and strategic motivations, this section describes 
how Impact Equity was led to replace its originally qualitative definition of 
impact, considered as non-commensurable to financial return, with a definition 
of social impact as both quantitative and commensurable. 
5.1  Contested Definitions of “Social Impact” 
The evolution of impact investing in the 2010s illustrates tensions between 
alternative definitions of “social impact” on the two main dimensions previous-
ly discussed: impact as a non-commensurable quality of impactful businesses, 
and impact as a quantitative, financially commensurable asset. The opposition 
between these definitions is inscribed in the history of Impact Equity.  
From its inception (in the late 2000s), Impact Equity marketed itself as an 
experimental private equity fund, aiming to achieve social return in addition to 
a standard financial return – clearly abiding by a qualitative, non-
commensurable definition of impact. This strategy was linked to the context of 
the asset management company’s first fundraising. At that time, most of Impact 
Equity’s funders were private organisations (mostly banks and insurance com-
panies) that considered their investment in Impact Equity as a relatively stand-
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ard private equity investment. Impact was then considered a communication 
feature of funds in their relationship with institutional investors. For instance, 
at the beginning of the period, Impact Equity “materialised” impact through 
mostly qualitative criteria: it embodied “social impact” in rhetorical devices, 
seeking social labels, vaunting the “inspirational” aspect of portfolio companies 
and the “emblematic” personal trajectories of the CEOs of its invested compa-
nies, displaying pictures of them and their staff in their office and in newspa-
pers. 
However, reflecting a broader movement in the field, the composition of 
Impact Equity’s investors changed in its third fund (mid-2010s). The company 
gathered funding from investors specialising in impact investing, but who 
considered social impact as something that should be accounted for quantita-
tively (reflecting a broader trend in the sector, as highlighted by Chiapello and 
Godefroy 2017), maximised, and increasingly made commensurable to the 
initial financial investment. One of these financial institutions, the EIF, funded 
Impact Equity as part of a broader project aiming to “structure” the impact 
investing sector in Europe by promoting impact envisioned as an asset. Impact 
was thus being seen as both quantitative and commensurable to financial return 
(the EIF’s head of strategic development advocated the “pricing [of] social 
value” in a 2012 paper; Grabenwarter 2012). Consequently, the devices used to 
materialise “social impact” changed. New institutional investors such as the 
EIF asked Impact Equity to increasingly quantify its impact in order to be able 
to quantify the overall impact of the funds they invested in and to compare 
them with each other. In this approach, each new operation had to be followed 
by Francis, the associate of the fund, elaborating a set of ad hoc indicators 
(such as the proportion of grants provided to Business Academy students, as 
discussed in section 2) calculated before the buyout and updated each year 
during the operation.  
This redefinition of social impact affected the hierarchies between impact 
investors as it enabled the elaboration of new benchmarking devices. Initially, 
Impact Equity was not evaluated by considering numbers based on its social 
performance – its performance was purely evaluated through the IRR financial 
indicator and its impact generation was considered a distinguishing “brand” for 
the fund. The new measurement devices, however, aimed to make impact in-
vesting asset management companies comparable in terms of social impact 
generation. For instance, as it required the social performance of the funds it 
invested in to be evaluated by an independent “impact committee” (as part of 
the “social carried-interest” calculation), the EIF was arguably able to calculate 
and compare the percentage of achievement of social targets by each of the 
funds it invested in. 
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5.2  Navigating Alternative “Social Impact” Definitions, between 
Moral Beliefs and Strategic Motivations 
Impact Equity members navigated these conflicting definitions of “social im-
pact.” In 2015, Impact Equity attempted to reform its “investment strategy” to 
adapt it to the new definitions of impact that were promoted by the EIF and 
other specialised institutional investors in the mid-2010s. This reform took 
place during the corporate seminar I attended. Impact Equity’s members asked 
themselves how they could transform their investment criteria and whether they 
could maintain or remove the criterion of “impact through exemplarity” that 
was increasingly considered too qualitative for investors. 
In order to navigate these changes, Impact Equity’s members mobilised both 
moral beliefs and strategic reasoning. During Impact Equity’s corporate semi-
nar, Henri and Emilie, the president and a partner of Impact Equity, were ini-
tially in favour of trying to conserve the qualitative criteria (in particular “im-
pact through exemplarity”) in the “investment strategy” of the fund, despite the 
new requirements of their investors. For seemingly moral reasons, they were 
reluctant to adapt their investment practice to the increasingly financially 
commensurable definitions of “social impact” that were promoted by the fun-
ders. Indeed, most of them saw their engagement in Impact Equity as a rupture 
with their previous trajectory in the financial world (see Table 1) and a way of 
exercising their skills “differently” in a “more meaningful” way. Working at 
Impact Equity was perceived as part of a broader caritative engagement for its 
members. In an interview, Partner 2 explained to me that he decided to join 
Impact Equity to “do what he does best [investing…] with a caritative scope.” 
Emilie, a partner, expressed this more explicitly, explaining that for her work-
ing at Impact Equity was like “volunteering.” The shift from the qualitative, 
non-financially commensurable definition of impact, to the quantitative, as-
setised one, provoked debates within the fund as this shift was initially felt to 
be opposed to the search for a more “meaningful” activity. In an interview, 
noting his opposition to the quantitative and commensurable definitions of 
impact, Partner 2 complained that “[he] has been fed [quantitative] models for 
20 years,” and he asserted that he did not leave the financial industry to partici-
pate in the quantitative assetisation of society in his new life at Impact Equity.  
At the same time, Impact Equity managers were developing a strategic in-
terpretation of how the new definition of impact could affect their position in 
the impact investing market. As social impact was redefined, Impact Equity 
members felt that the “brand” they had constructed through their previous 
strategy (largely based on the “impact through exemplarity” investment criteri-
on) risked being devalued, resulting in the need to adopt new devices of “social 
impact” that were not “part of [their] DNA,” such as quantitative impact meas-
urement devices. In the discussions about whether to abandon the “impact 
through exemplarity” investment criterion, they were split into two main 
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groups: those opposed to (the president of Impact Equity and Alice, the intern) 
and those in favour of (Partners 1 and 2) the removal of the qualitative “impact 
through exemplarity” investment criterion. The members of the latter group 
asserted that they no longer saw the point of their historical “impact through 
exemplarity” criterion, in particular because of the emergence of new investors; 
as investors require a quantitative “materialisation” of impact, the criterion 
seemed outdated to them. However, the president of Impact Equity considered 
it necessary to think about the “image” of Impact Equity for investors and the 
public. “We have to remember that the ‘impact through the exemplarity [of the 
CEO]’ criterion is our trademark,” he asserted. According to him, if the fund 
removed this qualitative criterion from its impact strategy, it would lose its 
identity for investors and, as a consequence, a portion of its historical legitima-
cy as an impact investor. More strikingly, the removal of this criterion was also 
described by all Impact Equity members as a threat to their ability to find suffi-
cient “qualified deal flow” – as the criterion was quite broad and enabled them 
to label numerous companies “impactful.” Despite bringing them new inves-
tors, such as the EIF (a prestigious investor, which is why they finally decided 
to sacrifice the “impact through exemplarity” criterion), abiding by the new and 
more restrictive quantitative impact criteria would deprive them of many finan-
cially interesting investment opportunities.  
Therefore, fund managers interpret the new definitions of social impact as 
both moral and opportunistic actors, evaluating how they can benefit from this 
or, on the other hand, how it could devaluate their position in the sector. 
6.  Conclusion 
Impact investing has developed in the context of the financialisation of social 
policies (Dowling and Harvie 2014; Dowling 2016; Wiggan 2018; Golka 
2019). This movement not only requires the creation of a favourable institu-
tional arrangement and the supply of capital to the sector by public institutions, 
in which impact investors themselves actively participate. It also requires the 
reconfiguration of large parts of the social economy sector, on the one hand, 
and of the institutional investment sector, on the other, in order to make their 
actors adapt to impact investment.  
The nature of financialised social policies thus depends on how this double 
circulation is constructed. It depends on the tensions between actors with re-
gard to the definition of “social impact” (with two oppositions between quanti-
tative/qualitative and commensurable/non-commensurable definitions) and the 
devices that constitute its channels. By showing the role of moral beliefs and 
strategic motivations (the quantitative turn being, for instance, curbed by im-
pact investors’ fears of not finding enough corresponding investable “impactful 
businesses”) in this construction, this article outlines the social processes at 
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work in shaping the channels through which capital and “social impact” are 
conveyed. 
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